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Article
Institution Types and 
Institution Tokens: 
An Unproblematic 
Distinction?
Rico Hauswald1
Abstract
The distinction between institution types and institution tokens plays 
an important role in Francesco Guala’s philosophy of institutions. In this 
commentary, I argue that this distinction faces a number of difficulties that 
are not sufficiently addressed in Understanding Institutions. In particular, I 
critically discuss Guala’s comparison between the taxonomy of organisms 
and the taxonomy of institutions, consider the semantics of institution terms 
on different levels in this taxonomy, and argue for an alternative solution to 
the problem of how to reconcile reformism and realism about institutions 
like marriage.
Keywords
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1. Introduction
Understanding Institutions (Guala 2016, henceforth cited as “UI”) aims to pro-
vide a general theory of institutions that reconciles different accounts of institu-
tions, particularly the institutions-as-rules account and the institutions-as-equilibria 
account. While Guala had already presented various aspects of his views in a 
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number of papers, the main innovations of the book, in my view, come in the 
second part, which includes an extensive examination of the implications of a 
unified theory of institutions for various issues in social ontology and the phi-
losophy of the social sciences. Here, Guala brings together a number of debates 
that have rarely been discussed in context, such as the debates on interactive 
kinds, the meaning of social scientific terms, realism, and social reform. In these 
chapters, the great explanatory potential of his approach becomes apparent. For 
example, it provides an elegant explanation of “why a social category can be at 
the same time contingent (it is one among many possible equilibria) and stable 
(because it is an equilibrium)” (UI, 142) and suggests interesting new solutions 
to some of the theoretical problems surrounding interactive kinds—or at least a 
particular species of interactive kinds.1
Guala’s theory of institutions is explicitly naturalist. This is a feature 
that makes it highly attractive in my view. I agree with Guala that social 
ontology—and philosophy in general—should be as scientifically informed 
as possible. In many respects, the differences between social ontology, the 
philosophy of the social sciences, and social kinds on the one hand and 
natural philosophy, the philosophy of the natural sciences, and natural kinds 
on the other are smaller than have often been claimed. Thus, UI is a valu-
able counterweight to certain excesses of constructionism and subjectivism 
that have prevailed in recent social philosophy.
So while I am sympathetic to the overall project, there are a couple of 
aspects of the book that I have not found entirely convincing or about which I 
would have liked to read a bit more, and, as is typically expected of a commen-
tary, it is these aspects that I focus on. Many of the problems that I had with 
Guala’s arguments are in some way or another related to his distinction between 
1I do not think that all interactive kinds are institutional kinds, as Guala seems to 
suggest (UI, 139). I do not see, for instance, that all the kinds of mental illness that 
are typically considered to be paradigm cases of interactive kinds can reasonably be 
conceived of as institutional kinds. Another reason to suppose that there can be inter-
active kinds which are not institutional kinds comes from the following consideration: 
Institutions, according to Guala, are solutions to problems of coordination. As such, 
they logically presuppose the participation of at least two individuals. Interactive 
kinds, on the other hand, can be characterized as kinds that are subjected to what I call 
kind-looping, that is, changes that come as a result of the behavior of individuals who 
have realized that they are instances of the kind (see Hauswald 2016). While, typi-
cally, many individuals will be involved in looping processes of this sort, the lower 
limit to the number of individuals that are required is one, not two. It is logically pos-
sible that a solitary individual initiates a kind-looping. (Imagine, for example, the last 
human survivor of an extinction event artificially changing her genome and cloning 
herself, and thus changing the nature of Homo sapiens.)
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institution tokens and institution types. I therefore first take a closer look at 
possible criteria for distinguishing institution tokens and institution types and 
Guala’s comparison between creating hierarchical orderings of institutions and 
creating hierarchical orderings of organisms. Second, I discuss some method-
ological issues, particularly concerning the division of labor between philoso-
phers and social scientists and the semantics of terms referring to entities on 
different levels of Guala’s hierarchical ordering of institutions. Finally, I assess 
his solution to the problem of how to reconcile reformism and realism in rela-
tion to institutions like marriage and present an alternative to it.
2. Types and Tokens
According to Guala, institutions and institutional entities2 can only be under-
stood if we properly distinguish between institution types and institution 
tokens. A key to understanding this distinction is the idea that we can create 
hierarchical orderings of institutions much like we create hierarchical orderings 
of organisms. To use his own example (UI, xx), the Dutch Reformed Church is 
a Reformed church, a Reformed church is a Protestant church, a Protestant 
church is a church, a church is an institution. Actually, we may proceed to even 
higher levels: an institution is a correlated equilibrium (if Guala is right), a cor-
related equilibrium is a state, a state is an occurrent, an occurrent is an indi-
vidual.3 Similar orderings can be obtained for other institutions, such as 
2It is not quite clear to me what Guala means by “institutional entities.” He defines 
them as “object[s] with properties or characteristics that depend on the existence of an 
institution” (UI, xvii). One problem with this definition is that it turns everything into 
an institutional entity, as soon as there exists at least one institution i in the universe. 
The reason is that, arguably, every entity stands in some relation to i, such as the rela-
tion of being at such-and-such a distance from it. Every grain of sand on a different 
planet has the (relational) property of being at such-and-such a distance from i, which 
is a property that depends on the existence of an institution.
3I am not sure whether Guala would accept this extension of the ordering, but to me, 
it seems plausible. However, there is one thing that I found worrying when I thought 
about how to continue the ordering: While Guala argues that institutions are equi-
libria, he maintains that they are also rules—“depending on the perspective that one 
takes” (UI, 50), which is why he calls his account a “rules-in-equilibrium theory of 
social institutions.” But if we consider institutions to be rules, the resulting hierarchi-
cal ordering is different from the one that we obtain when we consider institutions 
to be equilibria. I am not quite sure which ontological category rules belong to, but 
I suspect that it is not the category of states. As a consequence, an institution would 
belong to two ontological categories: the category of states and the category to which 
rules belong. I find this troublesome, as most ontological systems require an entity to 
belong to one and only one ontological category.
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4The comparison between institutions and organisms is interesting not least because 
it transcends the divide between social kinds and natural kinds. I should note in this 
context that my considerations about types and tokens apply to both natural kinds and 
social kinds.
5If species are individuals, an example would be the sentence “Fido is a dog.”
6If “organism” is a type, an example would be the sentence “Fido is an organism.”
7I think that this explains why, for example, if something is an instance or a subtype 
of vertebrata, it is also a subtype or an instance of animal, while it is not necessarily 
an instance or a subtype of subphylum. Similarly, it explains why, for example, Caesar 
and Cleopatra’s marriage is a marriage, but it is not a type, even though marriage is 
(allegedly) a type.
marriage, private property, and money, which serve as Guala’s main examples. 
Presumably, marriage, private property, and money are on the same level of 
generality as church. The hierarchical orderings we obtain for such institutions 
obviously resemble the hierarchical orderings that we obtain for organisms: 
Fido is a dog, dogs are mammals, mammals are vertebrates, vertebrates are 
animals, animals are organisms, organisms are material beings, material beings 
are continuants, continuants are individuals.4
Intuitively, some of the elements in these orderings are individuals 
(tokens), others universals (types). Guala underscores the similarities between 
the orderings of organisms and institutions. While he conceives of species as 
individuals, he considers higher taxa to be types. Similarly, lower-order insti-
tutions (e.g., Dutch Reformed Church, Reformed church, and Protestant 
church) are supposed to be tokens, higher-order institutions (church and 
above) types.
If we encounter individuals or tokens at some levels and types at others, 
we should be aware of the different sorts of relationships that hold between 
the entities at these levels. These relationships include the type-subtype rela-
tion, the instantiation relation, and the part-of relation. Consider an assertion 
of the form “x is y” (or “all xs are ys”). If both x and y are individuals, of these 
three relations, only the part-of relation can hold between them (x is a part of 
y).5 If x is an individual and y is a type, only the instantiation relation can hold 
between them (x is an instance of y).6 Finally, if both x and y are types, the 
type-subtype relation can hold between them, but also the instantiation rela-
tion. For example, if marriage and higher biological taxa are types, the sen-
tences “Marriage is a type” and “Vertebrata is a subphylum” are true, as are 
the sentences “Marriage is an institution” and “Vertebrates are animals.” But 
in the first two sentences, “marriage” and “vertebrata”/“vertebrates” are 
instances of “type” and “subphylum,” while in the latter two sentences, they 
are subtypes of “institution” and “animals.”7 So, if x is an instance of y, x need 
not necessarily be a token.
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Plausible as this may be, the question of how exactly the type-token dis-
tinction should be applied to institutions or organisms is by no means an 
easy one to answer, and I do not find everything that Guala tells us about it 
completely convincing. Note, first, that there is no consensus among adher-
ents of the species-as-individuals thesis as to whether higher taxa are types 
or tokens like species. There are a number of authors who defend the view 
that higher taxa are individuals in the same way in which species are indi-
viduals (see, for example, Brigandt 2009). Others (like Wiley 1980) main-
tain that higher taxa exhibit properties of both individuals and types. I argue 
in Section 4 that applying the type-token distinction to higher-order institu-
tion terms like marriage, money, or church is equally difficult, and it appears 
that these alleged institution types exhibit some characteristics that we 
would expect to be characteristics of tokens.
But let us first take a look at the criteria that we can use to determine whether 
something is a type or a token. According to Guala (UI, xx), tokens are situated 
in space and time.8 For example, species develop at a particular point in time, 
exist for some period, and may finally cease to exist. While this may be true, I 
do not see that it already provides much help in demarcating tokens from types. 
Consider a paradigmatic case of a type, such as a certain chemical element (if 
you do not believe that chemical elements are types, take whatever you believe 
to be a paradigmatic type). It may well be that there is a point in time when 
instances of this type first appeared (e.g., heavy chemical elements did not exist 
at the outset of the Big Bang but developed as a result of nuclear synthesis 
within stars and supernovae), and it may well be that there is a point in time 
when the last instances of that type disappear (e.g., if the universe ends in a 
“Big Freeze,” chemical elements are expected to disappear one by one due to 
processes such as nuclear decay). Of course, one may hold a Platonist view, 
according to which a certain chemical element as a universal exists “ante rem,” 
that is, independently of whether there are instances of it. But even for a 
Platonist, spatio-temporal locatedness does not seem to be a good epistemic 
criterion for distinguishing tokens from types, since it does not help distinguish 
situations in which instances of a preexisting type appeared for the first time in 
history from situations similar to those that occur in the case of evolving spe-
cies. If one is an Aristotelian who holds that universals exist “in rebus,” the 
situation is even worse: for an Aristotelian (or at least an adherent of certain 
versions of Aristotelianism), not only does spatio-temporal locatedness appear 
to be an impractical epistemic criterion, but it misrepresents the metaphysical 
difference between tokens and types because, in a sense, chemical elements 
and other types are bound to time and space just like tokens are.
8“The main evidence that we are dealing with a token institution is that such entities 
have a history and a geographical location” (UI, xx).
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If spatio-temporal locatedness is not that helpful as a criterion, what else 
could do a better job? I would suggest that similarity is a good candidate. It 
seems to be a characteristic feature of types that all of their instances share 
certain similarities. On the other hand, the members of a species are similar 
to each other too, and a species is supposed to be a token. So similarity does 
not seem to be a good option either. But let us have a closer look. Let H be a 
concept of higher generality (such as “dog” or “gold”) and SO a set of indi-
vidual objects o1, o2, and so on, such that the sentences “ox is H” is true for all 
elements of SO. Let us assume that all the members of SO share certain simi-
larities. Now suppose that we are uncertain whether H is a type or a token. In 
other words, we have yet to determine whether the members of SO and H are 
related to each other by the instantiation relation (such as in “This is gold”) 
or the part-of relation (such as in “Fido is a dog”). How do we find out which 
possibility is realized? One way is to imagine a new object on that is similar 
to the members of SO. Does this similarity suffice for the sentence “on is H” 
to be true? I submit that if the answer is yes, then H is a type. If H is a token, 
the sentence “on is H” is true only if on also stands in other relevant relations 
to the members of SO (i.e., other than similarity). In the case of species, one 
might consider something like biological kinship. For example, one might 
imagine a living being from a distant planet that resembles a dog (it looks like 
a dog, behaves like a dog, etc.) but did not descend from dogs; hence, there is 
no biological kinship between on and the members of SO. Is this creature a 
dog? Intuitively it is not, despite its similarity to dogs. So the crucial point 
seems to be that if on is similar to the other instances of a given type H, this 
similarity is sufficient for on to be an instance of H as well. On the other hand, 
if H is a token, similarity between on and other parts of H is not sufficient to 
turn on into a part of H. If H is a token, its parts may or may not be related by 
similarity, they are necessarily related by further relationships, such as bio-
logical kinship.
3. Some Methodological Queries
Numerous philosophers hold that ontology is concerned exclusively with the 
most general categories, that is, the levels of material beings, states, and 
above in the mentioned orderings. As Guala reminds us, ontology is con-
cerned with “What is X?” questions. But not every “What is X?” question—or 
more precisely, not every answer to such a question—is an ontological one. 
“This is Fido” or “This is a dog” are not ontological answers to the question 
of someone who points to Fido and asks, “What is this?” The assertion that it 
is a material being and a continuant, on the other hand, most people will pre-
sumably accept as an ontological statement.
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9“What money is . . . is not conventional at all” (UI, 176) but determined by how the 
world is.
In UI, Guala is concerned with questions such as “What is marriage?” He 
gives two kinds of answers. The first kind includes answers such as “mar-
riage is a correlated equilibrium (because it is an institution)” and “marriage 
constitutes a cluster of problems, including problems of procreation, prob-
lems of education, issues of economic cooperation, and mutual emotional 
and affective support” (cf. UI, 198). The second kind of answers includes 
statements like, “marriage is a type.” While the latter answer certainly sounds 
like an ontological one, answers of the first sort will often not be accepted as 
being ontological or even philosophical answers, but will be considered 
social scientific ones. This is not meant as a criticism. Guala’s approach is 
explicitly naturalist and interdisciplinary, and he has good reasons to deal 
extensively with social scientific theories. However, there is a set of issues 
about which I would have liked to read a bit more. While the social-scientific 
answers comprise most of the book, explicitly ontological aspects strike me 
as being relatively underexplored. This is regrettable, not just because these 
ontological aspects are interesting in their own right but also because the 
social-scientific answers could have benefited from a more extensive consid-
eration of ontological issues. As an example, consider the problem that I 
mentioned in footnote 3: according to Guala, institutions are both equilibria 
and rules. However, given that rules do not belong to the same ontological 
category as equilibria, this seems to imply that there is no single category for 
institutions—which might be considered to be quite an implausible conclu-
sion. Also, what about the relationship between the two kinds of answers that 
Guala gives? In the previous section, I stated that marriage is a subtype of 
correlated equilibrium but an instance of type (provided that it is a type). It 
seems to me that the book would have benefited from exploring more fully 
the implications of Guala’s answers.
A related issue that I found to be somewhat underexplored is the division of 
labor between philosophers and empirical scientists. One aspect in which this 
division is particularly relevant is meaning. In chapters 12, 13, and 14, Guala 
argues for a version of externalism when it comes to the meaning of institution 
terms. Like our need to defer to physics and chemistry when we want to know 
what water is (or what the meaning of the term water is), we need to defer to 
social scientists when we want to know what marriage is (or what the meaning 
of the term marriage is) or when we want to know the meaning of other insti-
tution terms at the same level of generality, such as church, property, or 
money.9 While I find this plausible, I suppose that it is true only of the social-
scientific answers. An ontological answer like “marriage is a type” does not 
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seem to me to be a matter of social scientific investigation in the same way 
that answers like “marriage is a correlated equilibrium” or “marriage consti-
tutes a cluster of problems, including problems of procreation, problems of 
education, issues of economic cooperation, and mutual emotional and affec-
tive support” may be.
And what about institution terms at other levels of generality? For exam-
ple, what about institution terms at lower levels, such as “Dutch Protestant 
Church” or “Euro?” If the entities to which these terms refer (i.e., the Dutch 
Protestant Church and the Euro) are tokens or individuals, it seems that these 
terms are best conceived of as proper names. Proper names are directly refer-
ring expressions like natural kind terms (or “real kind terms,” as one may 
prefer to call them). However, their semantic properties are not completely 
the same, so it would be interesting to learn a bit more about how lower-level 
institution terms function semantically.
What about institution terms at higher levels of generality; in particular, 
what about the term institution itself? Of course, Guala’s view is that the social 
sciences must play a crucial role in determining what institutions are in gen-
eral. After all, the theories of institutions that he discusses and wants to unify 
are predominantly theories that have been developed by social scientists. But 
is the way in which we need to defer to the empirical sciences when we want 
to determine the meaning of “institution” exactly the same as when we want 
to determine the meaning of “marriage” or “church?” There are several pas-
sages in which Guala invokes linguistic intuitions: “The pair of strategies DD 
[in a prisoner’s dilemma] is an equilibrium, but intuitively it is not an institu-
tion” (UI, 51; emphasis added). And “[w]e are reluctant to speak of institu-
tions” in the case of male specimens of Pararge aegeria that engage in repeated 
hawk-dove games (UI, 52f.).10 If linguistic intuitions play an essential role in 
determining what “institution” means, there seems to be a disanalogy to the 
determination of the meaning of terms like church, marriage, or water. 
Concerning the meaning of “water,” externalists deny that folk linguistic intu-
itions like “water is a transparent, colorless, odorless liquid” have any rele-
vance for the question of what “water” means. So what exactly is the role that 
intuitions are supposed to play in determining the meaning of “institution?” 
How are we to solve potential conflicts between our intuitions and the unified 
theory of institutions? Could it be that the theory identifies something as an 
institution that we would not intuitively accept as an institution? Conversely, 
could it be that intuitively something is an institution that is not an institution 
according to the theory? How are we to resolve such discrepancies?
10“[A]nimals do not have institutions” (UI, 52). Is this supposed to be an empirical 
generalization? Or a law of nature? Or a conceptual truth?
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4. Reform, Realism, and Changing Kinds
In Chapter 14, Guala discusses how it is possible to be both a reformist and a 
realist about social institutions. He identifies a tension between realist and 
constructionist ambitions in Sally Haslanger’s “ameliorative approach,” 
which proposes to redefine institutions so that they better serve our goals and 
purposes. Realism, on the other hand, implies that we cannot freely or arbi-
trarily stipulate what an institution is: the world is supposed to tell us.
Being a realist about X means believing that X really exists and that the 
world determines (at least in part) the meaning of our concepts referring to X. 
Being a reformist about X means believing that X should and can be different 
in the future than it is today. We should note that, in general, attempting to be 
both a reformist and a realist about something need not be theoretically dif-
ficult. For example, suppose you are an environmental reformist who wants 
to reduce pollution, stop global warming, change our attitude about nature, 
and so on. It is not difficult at all to be a realist about these issues at the same 
time. There really is a certain level of pollution today; reformists attempt to 
change that level, that is, to change how we deal with the environment in such 
a way that there will be a new, lower, but equally real level of pollution in the 
future. Reformism about X requires X to be changeable, but the changeability 
of X is not incompatible with its reality.
I have elsewhere developed a model of changing kinds that is based on the 
homeostatic-property-cluster account and designed to support an ontology of 
interactive kinds (see Hauswald 2016). The key idea is that interactive kinds 
are kinds that are subject to what I call “kind-looping,” that is, a sort of loop-
ing effect that needs to be distinguished from other forms, most notably, 
“individual-looping” and “category-looping.” Kind-looping occurs when a 
kind changes as a result of the behavior of individuals who have realized that 
they are instances of the kind. Since interactive kinds are a species of chang-
ing kinds, a precondition for understanding the former is understanding 
changing kinds in general; therefore, much of my model is devoted to recon-
structing the ontology of changing kinds. Here is a sketch of how I conceive 
of changing kinds. If, in a multidimensional space of properties (MSP), in 
which every dimension represents a property, all existing individuals are 
recorded, we observe that these individuals will be distributed neither homo-
geneously nor randomly. Rather, in some areas, there will be many individu-
als, while other areas remain empty. I call the latter areas “realization gaps,” 
the former ones “realization accumulations.” The accumulations can be iden-
tified with real kinds. Now, a change of a kind can be modeled as a movement 
of a realization accumulation through the MSP. For example, the evolution of 
biological species—a paradigmatic case of changing kinds—can be modeled 
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11This is part of an explanation of why some natural-kind terms change their reference 
or are used differently by different linguistic communities. For example, “apple” was 
formerly used for all fruit other than berries, and “cobra” for all snakes. See Evans 
(1982) for a classical examination of the phenomenon of reference change in names 
and natural kind terms; the examples are taken from p. 390, n. 16.
straightforwardly in this way. At a point in time t1, the existing members of a 
given species occupy a certain region in the MSP. If at a later time, the spe-
cies faces new environmental challenges, it will develop so that it can meet 
those challenges. The later specimens will not occupy the same region in the 
MSP as the earlier specimens. The realization accumulation has moved 
through the MSP.
So there seems to be no big problem in reconciling realism and reformism, 
neither in general nor in the particular case of real kinds. So why is there a 
problem in the case of marriage? I think that for Guala, the problem arises 
because he conceives of marriage as an abstract, ahistorical type. Entities that 
are located in space and time (such as species) are capable of change. Abstract 
entities, on the other hand, do not seem to be. So how can one be a reformist 
about marriage? Guala’s answer draws on the fact that not all possible instances 
of a type need to be instantiated at a given time. Marriage may have been 
restricted to heterosexual couples for a long period of time. However, this does 
not exclude the possibility that the concept “marriage” may apply to homo-
sexual couples as well. To exclude this possibility would be as fallacious as 
concluding that uranium has only isotopes ranging from 217 to 238. As Guala 
argues, we need theoretical physics to tell us that uranium-239 is a possible 
subtype of uranium. Similarly, we need a theory of institutions (and, arguably, 
a special theory of marriage) “to tell us which marriages can exist” (UI, 198).
One potential difficulty for Guala’s argument is that heterosexual mar-
riage could be interpreted as a kind, much like marriage can be. Guala’s 
point is reminiscent of what is called “qua-problem” by Devitt (1981) and 
“problem of underdetermination of meaning by deixis” by Wiggins (1994). 
The difficulty is that an ostensive reference to a sample of instances of a cer-
tain kind (like the baptism that is invoked in some versions of semantic exter-
nalism) may be insufficient to precisely determine the meaning of a linguistic 
term, because the objects of the sample may be simultaneous instances of 
more than one kind. For example, a sample of tigers instantiates the kind 
tiger, but it also instantiates the kinds mammal, vertebrate, predator, and so 
on. As a consequence, if tigers are the only predators known to the members 
of a given linguistic community up to a certain point in time, and if they use 
the word “tiger” to refer to them, there is no fact of the matter as to whether 
or not they should also apply the term to other predators when they later hap-
pen to encounter such animals; they have to make a decision.11 Similarly, 
604 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48(6) 
introducing the term marriage by referencing a sample of exclusively hetero-
sexual couples is underdetermined in that it is unclear to which kind it refers: 
the kind heterosexual marriage or the kind marriage. While homosexual 
couples may be instances of the latter kind, they cannot be instances of the 
former. So a potential opponent of Guala could insist that the meaning of the 
term marriage is not already fixed. It is open-textured (to use an expression 
of Friedrich Waismann). Whether homosexual couples should be included in 
its extension is a matter of stipulation and convention: we have to make a 
decision as to how we want to use the term in the future.
One way that Guala could counter this argument is as follows. While he 
may grant that the meaning of the term marriage is underdetermined and that 
we have to make a decision as to how we want to use it, he could insist that 
not all possible decisions are equally justified. Provided that the “natural” in 
“natural kind” is gradable, and some kinds are more natural than others, he 
may argue that the kind marriage is more natural than the kind heterosexual 
marriage. To draw on what may be an awkward analogy, while the term mar-
riage is more like predator in that both are highly explanatory and function-
ally defined concepts, “heterosexual marriage” is more like “night-active 
predator” in that both refer to certain special cases and have less explanatory 
power. However, in response, Guala’s critic could insist that terms like het-
erosexual marriage or night-active predator should not be denied all explan-
atory power. And a concept may be useful even if it has little explanatory 
power and naturalness. Moreover, in addition to its explanatory power, there 
are a variety of reasons why a certain concept may be useful to us.
Let us suppose that reformists can somehow handle the latter problem. As 
a preliminary conclusion to this section, we can then note that even if reform-
ists about marriage may not be able to change what marriage is, they can do 
two things. First, they can attempt to change our conception of what marriage 
is. While people may have believed in the past that marriage is restricted to 
heterosexual couples, they may be convinced that the concept “marriage” 
should also apply to homosexual couples. Second, they can attempt to change 
the world in a way that facilitates the emergence of instantiations that have 
not existed in the past.
Now, while these may be legitimate ways for reformists to address mar-
riage, my aim in the remainder of this section is to question the claim that 
marriage is an abstract ahistorical entity that is incapable of change. If it can 
be shown that marriage is capable of change, a reformist would potentially 
have a third, less problematic option, namely to change marriage itself.
According to Guala, marriage should be defined functionally. Its function 
is to provide solutions to certain problems of coordination, including prob-
lems of procreation, education, economic cooperation, and mutual emotional 
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and affective support (UI, 198). These problems (or, perhaps more adequately, 
the corresponding functions) “constitute a ‘cluster’ in the Boyd-Mill sense” 
(UI, 198). As a consequence, there is no single function that must be fulfilled 
for something to count as a marriage; all that is required is that a sufficiently 
large subset of these functions is fulfilled.
The problems to which marriage provides solutions are quite universal. In 
various cultures, people need to procreate, raise their children, cooperate eco-
nomically, support each other emotionally and affectively, and so on. We 
might say that marriage is grounded in certain anthropological fundamentals, 
in the biological nature that all human beings share, and in certain principles 
in which societies are organized. Given that they are faced with similar chal-
lenges, it is not surprising that members of different cultures have indepen-
dently “invented” similar solutions. As I have argued in Section 2, it is a 
feature of types that something is an instance of a type by virtue of being 
similar to its other instances. So if different cultures have independently pro-
duced certain solutions to fundamental problems of life, and if all these solu-
tions equally count as marriages by virtue of being similar to each other, this 
seems to be strong evidence that marriage is a type.
Suppose now that the problems to which marriage provides solutions are 
changing. For one, certain problems could be shaped differently than they 
were in the past. For example, suppose that in some future time, babies will be 
created only by in vitro fertilization. It can also be that certain problems disap-
pear altogether. For example, suppose that in some future time, children will 
not only be created by in vitro fertilization, but also grow up solely in artificial 
uteri. Or suppose that, due to some advance in medicine, people will be virtu-
ally immortal and acquire no more children at all. In such scenarios, it seems 
to me that the problems of procreation and education may no longer be parts 
of the marriage-cluster. It is not just that in the imagined scenarios certain pos-
sible forms of marriage are, for contingent reasons, not instantiated; rather, 
marriage itself has changed. If, as I said, marriage is grounded in certain 
anthropological fundamentals, in the biological nature that all human beings 
share, and in certain societal principles, we must consider the possibility that 
all of these can change. The species Homo sapiens is evolving just like other 
species; presumably, it evolves even faster because of the immense impact of 
technological and cultural innovations. So should we not conceive of our 
social institutions as developing just like, and because, our nature and our situ-
ation in the world is developing? And since these future developments are 
basically unpredictable, we cannot predict how our institutions will change. 
Problems or functions that are now included in the marriage-cluster could 
become insignificant, and others may be added to the cluster, but we have not 
the slightest idea what they will be. For these reasons, I do not think that we 
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12I suppose that similar things may be said about other institutions such as money, 
private property, or church. With respect to the latter, think, for example, of the his-
torical development of religions from paleolithic forms to polytheism, monotheism, 
New Age religion, etc.
can have a theory that tells us which marriages can exist. Maybe we can have 
a theory that tells us which isotopes of uranium can exist. But if this is so, this 
only suggests that the analogy between uranium and marriage is odd.
So it seems to me that in some important respects, marriage is more like a 
species than an ahistorical, eternal entity. Like species, it can move through 
the MSP and evolve historically.12 Perhaps to an Aristotelian, this is not yet 
sufficient evidence to deny marriage the status of a type; but to a Platonist it 
certainly is. In any case, a reformist about marriage has a third option (in 
addition to changing the set of instantiations and our conception of the kind): 
to change the kind as such.
Of course, one might ask “how far” a kind can move through the MSP 
without ceasing to exist. In other words, how different could a future practice 
be for it to still count as a marriage? (Suppose that the components of the 
marriage-cluster are replaced one by one with new ones.) I do not think that 
we can give a general answer to this question. There is also a second reason, 
in addition to the one I discussed with respect to the qua-problem, why I dis-
agree with Guala when he says that the question of what money (or marriage 
etc.) is, is not at all conventional (UI, 176). There is necessarily a conventional 
element because, even if the realization gaps between the realization accumu-
lations in the MSP help us in demarcating real kinds, it is a matter of conven-
tion as to how far the accumulations can move and how small the gaps may 
become before the kinds are no longer numerically the same. This is one of the 
reasons why Boyd maintains that even if real kinds are to some extent made 
by nature, they are also the “workmanship of women and men” (Boyd 1999).
5. Conclusion
I have tried to show that the distinction between institution types and institu-
tion tokens faces a number of difficulties that are not sufficiently addressed 
in UI. While tokens are certainly concrete entities, Platonists and Aristotelians 
disagree as to whether types are somehow bound to space and time as well. 
In any case, spatio-temporal locatedness does not seem to be a good epis-
temic criterion for distinguishing types from tokens.
Missing from UI is also an examination of the semantics of institution 
terms at different levels of generality. Presumably, determining the meaning 
of mid-level terms like marriage is different from that of lower-level terms 
like Dutch Protestant Church and that of higher-level terms like institution.
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Finally, I have argued that a reformist about marriage or other institutional 
entities at similar levels of generality can pursue a third strategy: she can 
attempt to change marriage itself. This strategy is compatible with realism 
just like the other strategies. Unlike them, however, it requires marriage to be 
changeable. I have tried to show that it is plausible to assume that it is.
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